As the conflict in Iran intensifies, European cities have come into the range of Tehran’s weapons. Euronews inquired with NATO about its defense strategies against such attacks and consulted a political violence expert to understand alternative methods Iran might employ against Europe.
Following the US and Israeli strikes targeting Iranian positions — resulting in the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and severely weakening Iran’s military and security forces — Tehran has responded with an unprecedented campaign of missile and drone attacks across the region.
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Iran has fired projectiles at targets in Israel and the Gulf, and an Iranian-made drone attacked a British base in Cyprus — prompting Prime Minister Keir Starmer to authorize UK bases for US counter-strikes targeting Iranian missile facilities.
Moreover, NATO air defense systems successfully intercepted two Iranian ballistic missiles bound for or already crossing Turkish airspace, a line Tehran had never breached before.
With Europe now nearer than ever to the war’s blast zone, an urgent question arises: could Iran launch a strike on continental Europe next? Should it attempt this, would NATO be able to prevent it?
Weapons Iran could actually deploy against Europe
Iran’s long-range arsenal consists of three main types, each with a range covering expansive areas of Europe.
The most potent is the Khorramshahr ballistic missile, capable of carrying warheads weighing as much as 1,800 kg.
Operated from fortified underground bases in northwestern Iran—in mountainous zones like Kermanshah, Tabriz, and Isfahan—it can reach distances up to 3,000 km when carrying lighter payloads.
At this range, cities such as Athens, Sofia, and Bucharest fall within striking distance. Pushing to full capacity, it could also threaten Vienna, Rome, and Berlin.
Next are the drones. The Shahed-136 has been battle-tested extensively and refined through combat in Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and has a maximum range of 2,500 km.
Although its warhead size—between 30 and 50 kg—is relatively small, these drones attack in groups, designed not to demolish structures but to overwhelm air defenses and disrupt power grids across large regions, as evidenced in Ukraine. Portions of Europe might face similar risks.
The third category involves cruise missiles, notably the Soumar and its variants, which have ranges spanning 2,000 to 3,000 km.
Unlike ballistic missiles, cruise missiles maintain low altitude flight and navigate terrain contours, making them significantly more difficult to detect with standard radar. Their precision suits them well for targeted strikes on infrastructure rather than wide-scale destruction.
Combined, these three weapons provide Iran with a multi-tiered long-range strike capacity that increasingly overlaps European territories.
Israel serves as the most tested example of missile defense under real conflict conditions.
Throughout this ongoing conflict, Iran launched between 500 and 550 ballistic missiles toward Israeli targets, while Israel’s layered defense network—including Arrow 2, Arrow 3, and David’s Sling interceptors—prevented all but 31 from reaching populated zones.
Nevertheless, some vulnerabilities exist. Iran has customized its missiles to evade interception; for instance, the Khorramshahr-4 reportedly re-enters the atmosphere at speeds near Mach 8, leaving defenders almost no time to react.
Further, Iran’s advanced warheads can adjust their descent path to confuse radar tracking, and Iran rarely fires ballistic missiles alone—usually combining them with cruise missiles and drone swarms to saturate air defenses.
Should Iran opt to attack Europe, experts expect a multifaceted strategy involving precision strikes against NATO logistics centers and economic disruption via assaults on Mediterranean port facilities or LNG terminals located in Italy, Greece, and Romania.
Additionally, psychological warfare could be deployed through attacks and feints intended to instill fear among civilians.
NATO’s stance: ‘Europeans can sleep soundly at night’
NATO adopts a strongly reassuring public position, emphasizing the alliance’s recently demonstrated defensive capabilities.
In an interview with Euronews, Colonel Martin L. O’Donnell, spokesperson for Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), did not outright dismiss nor confirm an Iranian strike scenario on Europe but clearly expressed NATO’s confidence.
“NATO possesses the necessary means to protect Alliance territory and its one billion residents. Europeans—I myself live in Europe—should feel secure knowing that NATO can neutralize any threats posed to the alliance,” Colonel O’Donnell stated.
He cited recent missile interceptions in Turkish airspace as tangible proof of NATO’s operational capabilities. The complete procedure—from launch detection to target neutralization—takes less than 10 minutes.
The process starts in space. “The initial step is detecting missile launches via various assets, including space-based systems,” O’Donnell explained.
“After detection, the missile’s trajectory is tracked using land, sea, and space-based platforms,” he continued.
“Finally, NATO must intercept and destroy the missile, a capability we have conclusively demonstrated.”
What about European nations outside NATO’s protection umbrella? Cyprus, Ireland, Austria, Switzerland, and Malta are non-members, and NATO’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) framework is explicitly designed to protect “all NATO European populations, territory, and forces.” Technically, this limits protection for non-member states.
In reality, the situation is more nuanced. EU membership brings additional obligations; under Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union, an attack on a member state legally demands assistance from all others.
The European Sky Shield initiative—a German-led program incorporating neutral nations like Austria and Switzerland—progressively integrates non-NATO countries into the collective continental air defense system.
Recent incidents underscore that political will may outweigh legal boundaries. When Iranian attacks struck Cyprus, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain swiftly deployed frigates and F-16s to protect Cypriot airspace, acting outside formal NATO structures.
Ireland, despite being a non-NATO country, indicated willingness to join this coalition if requested.
The drone challenge: less costly, slower, yet more difficult to counter
Ballistic missiles are high-speed and powerful, with a long history of NATO defense experience and robust countermeasures. Drone swarms represent a distinct and newer threat.
O’Donnell acknowledged drones as a genuine challenge but highlighted NATO’s new counter-drone system being rolled out in Poland and Romania: the Merops. It deploys small, inexpensive interceptor drones that collide with or detonate near incoming Shahed-type targets.
“This domain requires ongoing effort,” O’Donnell noted. “We recently introduced Merops in Poland and Romania, which has gained attention as Ukraine offers similar capabilities to the Middle East. NATO must continue adapting and responding, and it will.”
In Ukraine, comparable systems reportedly neutralize up to 40% of incoming Shahed drones, with domestic tools increasing intercept rates to 80%. However, approximately 20% still penetrate defenses and strike targets.
Given Merops’ deployment in Eastern Europe, can Europeans truly feel safe at night?
Beyond missiles and drones: Iran’s tactics of terror
Any Iranian assault on Europe would likely extend beyond military strikes. Analysts warn that Tehran’s approach is broader and often harder to counter.
“It’s a genuine concern for European residents and states,” says Graig R Klein, assistant professor at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University.
“Iran has a documented history of collaboration with criminal groups and possible Iranian agents or assets operating within Europe to execute terrorist acts or violence. Such incidents have occurred before.”
Since 2021, European intelligence agencies have noted a marked increase in Iran-linked plots on European soil, primarily targeting dissidents, Persian-speaking journalists, Jewish communities, and Israeli citizens.
Many of these attacks are outsourced to local criminal networks, complicating attribution and prosecution. This pattern led the EU to designate Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization on 29 January 2026.
Klein suggests Iran is likely to continue targeting dissidents, journalists, and Jewish groups, particularly as current leadership under Ayatollah Mojtaba Khomenei—the son of the late supreme leader—follows the same regime policies. However, if Tehran perceives its survival directly at risk, escalation on European territory could occur.
“Increased European involvement escalates risks to the general public,” Klein notes.
“It’s possible Iranian state agents are already positioned within Europe, awaiting activation. If the conflict prolongs and appears to move towards regime change or political instability, activation could follow.”
An additional escalation could arise if Iran resumes its nuclear weapons program, threatening not only Israel and the Middle East but any European military bases or forces Iran associates with the conflict.
Iranian-American political scientist Saeid Golkar detailed nuclear proliferation risks in a Euronews opinion piece.
“If Washington and Israel focus solely on degrading nuclear and military capacities and then halt efforts, the likely political outcome isn’t a democratic transition but consolidation by the remaining security elite,” Golkar explained.
“Partial dismantling is risky. Pausing too early can provoke swift retaliation and reinforce the regime’s belief that only nuclear weapons deter foreign aggression.”
“This reflects the classic ‘what doesn’t kill the regime makes it stronger’ dynamic, now intensified by nuclear considerations,” Golkar added.
A step below full nuclear armament is a dirty bomb—a conventional explosive combined with radioactive material.
Experts generally agree Iran has the technical ability to construct such a device but probably would not deploy it. A dirty bomb is easily traceable, and its use—or provision to proxies—would spark retaliatory actions that could threaten regime survival.
Currently, Klein does not anticipate large-scale Iranian targeting of civilian populations in Europe.
“If Iran activates these cells, government institutions and politicians would be the primary targets,” Klein stated.
“Iran’s assets are limited and constantly degraded. It’s unlikely Iran seeks to draw more European countries into direct large-scale confrontation,” he added.
“Instead, Iran aims to punish European governments involved in the conflict — attempting to sow discord and create tension within European societies.”
“Iran’s strategy resembles Russia’s playbook: fueling domestic unrest, destabilizing politics, and diminishing European countries’ capacity to engage in this conflict,” he concluded.
Other anticipated Iranian tactics include cyberattacks against industrial control systems in water, energy, and healthcare sectors, along with maritime sabotage in European waters.
When asked if NATO anticipates such hybrid threats specifically from Iran, Colonel O’Donnell replied cautiously yet directly.
“NATO’s strategic concept and all 32 allies have officially identified Russia and terrorist groups as primary threats,” he explained.
“However, as NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte has frequently emphasized, countries like China, North Korea, and Iran support Russia. We’ve seen them backing the war in Ukraine.”
“We must consider this broader reality and develop appropriate defenses,” he concluded.